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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
appeals from his judgments
guilty pleas to possession of a stolen vehicle in CR-F12-17453 and grand
CR-F12-19904.

in

On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On September 21, 2012, officers located McKnight ducking into a stolen vehicle
parked on the street.

(PSI, pp.3-4.)

McKnight was arrested and charged with

possession of a stolen vehicle. (41538 R., pp.44-45.) McKnight pleaded not guilty and
was released on his own recognizance. (41538 R., pp.42, 46-48.)
While he was out on release, McKnight committed a new felony, stealing a
woman's Child Support debit card toward the end of October. (PSI, pp.4-5.) McKnight
was again arrested and was charged with grand theft for stealing the financial card.
(41537 R., pp.34-35.) The court set bail at $50,000.00. (41537 R., p.25.)
McKnight entered a global plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to
the charges in both cases in exchange for the state recommending probation and not
filing additional charges. (41537 R., p.39; 41538 R., p.52; see also Tr., p.6, L.12 - p.7,
L.17.)

McKnight pleaded guilty to both charges (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-24), and he was

released on his own recognizance pending sentencing (41537 R., p.40). A presentence
report was prepared and filed on January 23, 2013.

(See PSI, p.1.) McKnight then

failed to appear at his sentencing hearing on February 25, instead absconding.

(See

41537 R., p.46; 41538 R., p.58.) The court issued bench warrants in each case (id.)
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and. eventually, McKnight was returned to custody (41537 R., pp.47-48; 41538 R.,
pp.59-60).
McKnight moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he was incompetent
to plead guilty. (41537 R., pp.49-50; 41538 R., pp.61-62.) McKnight also requested a
mental health evaluation (41537 R., pp.51-52; 41538 R., pp.63-64), which the district
court ordered (41537 R., pp.54-55; 41538 R., pp.66-67).
hearing on McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

The district court held a
(Tr., pp.21-32.) Finding

that McKnight failed to make the required showing to withdraw his guilty pleas, the
district court denied the motions. (41537 R., p.65; 41538 R., p.77; see also Tr., p.25,
L.21 - p.27, L.10.)
The district court entered judgment against McKnight in both cases and
sentenced him to concurrent unified terms of seven years with two years fixed on the
possession of the stolen vehicle and the grand theft. (41537 R., pp.70-74; 41538 R.,
pp.82-86.)

McKnight filed timely notices of appeal.

(41537 R., pp.76-77; 41538 R.,

pp.88-89.)
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the cases.
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ISSUE
McKnight states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas?
(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McKnight failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas?
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ARGUMENT
Mckniaht Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Motions To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas
Introduction
Below, McKnight moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he was not
competent to plead guilty. (41537 R., pp.49-50; 41538 R., pp.61-62.) The district court
rejected McKnight's assertion, finding that his psychological evaluation supported the
conclusion that McKnight was competent to plead guilty. (Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.27, L.10.)
On appeal, McKnight argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
pre-sentencing motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) A

review of the record and the applicable law, however, supports the district court's
determination that McKnight failed to carry his burden of establishing a just reason
entitling him to withdraw his pleas. McKnight has failed to establish an abuse of the
district court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct.
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).
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McKnight Failed To Show Either That His Plea Was lnvoluntarv Or That There
Existed Any Other Just Reason For Withdrawing His Plea
, a

sentence is imposed.

raw a

presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not

an automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284
(1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears the burden
of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.

Hanslovan, 147

Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780.
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must determine,
as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991); Hanslovan,
121 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense,
then the court must determine whether other reasons exist to allow the defendant to
withdraw the plea.

!9.c

When the motion is made prior to sentencing, the defendant must present a just
reason for withdrawing the plea.

Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780;

McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361, 941 P.2d at 333. The decision to grant or deny a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court.

!9.c

Where the

defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before the imposition of sentence "but after
[he] has read his presentence report or received other information about his probable
seruence, the court is to exercise broad discretion, but may temper its liberality by
weighing the defendant's apparent motive." State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816
P.2d 364, 366 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). The failure of a defendant to present
and support a plausible reason, even in the absence of prejudice to the state, will dictate
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granting withdrawaL

State v. \/\Jard, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392
124 Idaho

McFarland, 130 Idaho at 362, 941

1,

1 P.2d 51,

(1

at 334)).

The district court concluded that McKnight's assertion that he was incompetent
due to mental health reasons to enter his guilty pleas was disproved by the record and
therefore did not demonstrate a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.25, L.21
- p.27, L.10.) This finding is supported by the record. In conjunction with his motions to
dismiss his guilty pleas, McKnight requested a mental health evaluation.

(41537 R.,

pp.51-52; 41538 R., pp.63-64.) The district court ordered the evaluation. (41537 R.,
pp.54-56; 41538 R., pp.66-67.) The mental health evaluator found that McKnight was
competent. (PSI, pp.46-47.)
Despite the clear finding that McKnight was competent, McKnight argued that the
mental health evaluation showed that he had been incompetent when he pleaded guilty.
(Tr., p.21, L.12 - p.22, L.21.) The district court rejected McKnight's interpretation of the
mental health evaluation, finding that it in fact supported the opposite conclusion: That
McKnight was competent when he entered his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21.) The
district court's finding is again supported by the evidence.

First, the psychological

evaluator never concluded that McKnight previously did have a psychotic disorder; only
that he could "have met the criteria for diagnosis in the past." (PSI, p.45.) Second, any
psychotic disorder McKnight could have had would have been substance induced. (Id.)
But at the time he pleaded guilty, McKnight affirmed that he was not "under the influence
of any drug, alcohol or medicine." (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23.)

Because McKnight was not

abusing substances when he entered his guilty pleas, there was no possibility that a

6

potential "substance induced psychotic disorder" may have rendered him incompetent
when he pleaded guilty. McKnight failed to show a just reason to support his motions to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
Though McKnight continues to dispute the district court's factual findings in this
regard on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.11-14), he has failed to show clear error in
those findings. Because there is no factual basis for McKnight's claim of incompetence,
the district court's order denying McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas on that
ground should be affirmed.
In addition

to reiterating the same argument as raised below, McKnight also

contends that the district court abused its discretion by requiring McKnight to make an
increased showing of good cause to withdraw his guilty pleas and that withdrawal
should be allowed because it would not prejudice the state. (Appellant's brief, pp.1114.) Applying the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, all of McKnight's
arguments fail.
After the district court had already made its ruling that McKnight failed to show a
just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, defense counsel noted, "for the record," that
McKnight had not seen the PSI or been aware of its recommendations before he

absconded. (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.) Even crediting this naked assertion, as the district
court appears to have done (see Tr., p.27, L.19), that does not show that McKnight was
not required to make a heightened showing to justify withdrawal of his guilty plea. First,
the relevant inquiry is whether McKnight was aware of the sentencing recommendations

before moving to withdraw his guilty plea, not whether he was aware of them before he
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absconded.

There was no argument below that McKnight was still unaware of the

sentencing recommendations when he moved to withdraw his plea.
Second, the legal standard for scrutinizing a defendant's motives is broader than
the defendant merely having read the PSI. As noted above, when a defendant moves
to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing "but after [he] has read his presentence
report or received other information about his probable sentence," the court may
consider "the defendant's apparent motive." Johnson, 120 Idaho at 411, 816 P .2d at
366 (emphasis added). Whether McKnight had read his PSI or not, he was certainly
aware that the state was no longer bound to its favorable sentencing recommendations
due to his absconding. Furthermore, whether McKnight knew what the PSl's specific
recommendations would be, he apparently knew enough that he felt it necessary to
abscond and fail to appear for sentencing.
Finally, McKnight has failed to show that the district court actually "required an
increased showing of good cause" instead of just correctly stating the legal standard.
As noted above, McKnight failed as a factual matter to make any showing of cause. His
only argument was, based on a psychological evaluation conducted several months
after the fact, that he was not competent to enter his pleas. But, as noted above, the
district court rejected this argument, finding that the psychological evaluation actually
supported the opposite conclusion: That McKnight was competent to enter his guilty
pleas. (Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21.) McKnight's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was denied
because he failed to show any just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas, with or without a
heightened standard.
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McKnight also argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas
because withdrawal would not prejudice the state.

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Even

assuming, arguendo, that the state would not be prejudiced by allowing McKnight to
withdraw his guilty pleas, that inquiry is irrelevant until McKnight shows a just reason to
withdraw his guilty pleas. McKnight's sole argument-that he was incompetent to plead
guilty-lacked any factual support and was correctly rejected by the district court.
Because McKnight failed to show a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas, the district
court properly exercised its discretion by denying the motions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

DATED this 16th day of September, 2014.

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of September, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

RJS/pm
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